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ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes what can be surmised about the nature and causes of persistent poverty and how it affects Hispanics, especially Chicanos. Section 1, "Persistent Poverty among Urban Minorities: A Review of the Literature," reviews the overall literature on the subject. Both documentary literature describing persistent poverty and analytic and descriptive literature discussing the emergence of an urban underclass are considered. Section 2, "Modeling the Emergence of the Black Underclass," is an in-depth consideration of William Julius Wilson's model of the emergence of a persistently poor Black urban underclass, as presented in his book, "The Truly Disadvantaged," and of the applicability of this model to Hispanics. Factors distinguishing the experiences of Blacks and Hispanics are identified. Section 3, "The Wilson Model and Chicanos," compares data from the 1980 Census on the characteristics and situations of Blacks and Hispanics in three poor neighborhoods in Denver, Colorado. Section 4, "Conditions in Denver's Poorest Neighborhoods," discusses a profile of the overall population at risk of persistent poverty in the Denver metropolitan area. This profile suggests significant differences in the etiology of persistent poverty among Blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Whites. Six graphs and 12 tables are included, along with one figure. A list of 40 references is also included. A table of the number of underclass behaviors exhibited among minorities in individual Census tracts is appended. (JS)

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PERSISTENT URBAN POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS: A PERSPECTIVE BASED ON THE HISPANIC EXPERIENCE

by

Franklin J. James

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PERSISTENT URBAN POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS: A PERSPECTIVE BASED ON THE HISPANIC EXPERIENCE

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Executive Summary

This paper summarizes first what can be surmised about the nature and causes of persistent poverty, and second how it affects Hispanics. The term "underclass" has received analysis in varied literary genres. In popular literature, it has been presented by Atlantic Monthly in a two-article series written by Nicholas Lehmann (1986). Lehmann defines the underclass as Blacks living in urban ghettos, generally in persistent poverty and dependent for income on welfare or illicit activities.

More recently, scholars such as sociologist William Wilson of the University of Chicago have sought alternative explanations for the urban underclass. Wilson defines the underclass as "that heterogeneous grouping of inner-city families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system." Wilson does not attribute the problems of the urban underclass to dysfunctional cultural values but rather to life in destructive environments.

The Wilson Model and Hispanics

According to the Wilson model, four factors shape or limit its applicability in reference to Hispanics—particularly Mexican Americans. The following is a brief review of these factors.

1.) *Neighborhood Segregation and Concentration Effects*

Hispanics have experienced different patterns of neighborhood segregation than have Blacks. Detailed studies of neighborhood segregation of Hispanics by economic class or strata have found that patterns of Hispanic segregation have long resulted in a much greater separation of Hispanics by economic class than has been the case for Blacks.

The differences in the levels and trends in segregation of Blacks and Hispanics have complex implications for the strength of community-based organizations in Hispanic barrios and Black ghettos. Because Hispanics are more spread out geographically, they have had more access to mainstream businesses and organizations.

2.) *The Mexican American Family*

There is a variety of evidence that the structure and functions of the Mexican American family differ from those of the Black family. Joan Moore has depicted a family structure in which the needs of the Mexican American family collectively may be met before those of individuals and in which the family may serve as a place of refuge in times of need. She has also found a great value placed on women's roles as mothers, and a consequent high rate of fertility.

3.) *Immigration*

Net Black migration to central cities of the North stopped in many areas during the 1970s. Overall, the nation's central cities have experienced accelerating out-migration of Blacks since 1970. Streams of Mexican migration into central cities, on the other hand, are very large. Mexican immigrants are

young and, like other immigrants, strongly motivated to work. Moreover, Mexican immigrants, particularly the undocumented, are predominantly male and tend to move to communities with substantial Mexican-origin populations. The socioeconomic disposition of Mexican immigrants could have a profound effect on the Mexican American communities of the Southwest.

4.) *The Economic Context*

In the Southwest, the pace of metropolitan spatial decentralization is slower, because cities there are generally newer. Because Mexican Americans are disproportionately concentrated in new Sunbelt cities, they have not been victims of economic dislocation to the same extent as Blacks have been in the northern cities.

Persistent Poverty in Denver: A Case Study

There is a legitimate question on whether a Hispanic "underclass" exists in Denver or other places. The characteristics of persistently poor Hispanics imply a lesser prevalence of underclass behavior than among persistently poor Blacks.

Hispanics comprise the biggest single group of persons at risk of persistent poverty; 8,400 working-age adults at risk. Almost as many non-Hispanic White adults were at risk, 7,800 persons in 1980. Because Denver has a relatively small Black population, it is not surprising that Blacks are the smallest of the racial and ethnic groups at risk of persistent poverty--4,500 working working-age adults.

Of the serious economic barriers prevalent among persistently poor Hispanics, only dropping out of high school has been identified by previous researchers as an "underclass" behavior. High levels of fertility of husband-wife families is not the type of behavior associated by Wilson or other analysts with the underclass. Immigrant status is also independent of the underclass. Thus, the profile of persistent poverty in Denver supports the conclusion that the main causes of persistent poverty among Hispanics lie outside standard models of the underclass.

Summary Conclusion

The evidence from Denver leaves little doubt that persistent poverty among urban Mexican Americans is significant, and that its origins are poorly understood. The evidence strongly suggests that Wilson's model of the emergence of a Black underclass may have only limited applicability to Mexican Americans. That the two minority groups in the same neighborhoods should have such different experiences as do Blacks and Mexican Americans in Denver's impoverished neighborhoods strongly implies that there may be serious gaps in Wilson's model of the emergence of the underclass.

Persistent Urban Poverty and the Underclass: A Perspective Based on the Hispanic Experience

Hispanics, like Blacks, are highly disadvantaged in economic terms relative to non-Hispanic Whites. Poverty rates of both minority groups are more than twice as high as they are among non-Hispanic Whites. In 1985, 26 percent of Hispanic families were in poverty. This poverty indicator was slightly higher among Blacks (29 percent), but the gap between these two groups is narrowing. Hispanic poverty is on the increase: in 1980, 23 percent of Hispanic families were impoverished (U. S. Census). Poverty among Black families was the same in 1985 as it has been in 1980. Low relative economic status is also apparent for Hispanics in the labor force. National median annual earnings of full-time, year-round Hispanic workers are lower than they are among Black workers. The earnings of Black men employed full-time year-round average 30 percent less than those of White men (James and Applebaum, 1986).

It is surprising to discover the low economic status of Hispanics because most discussions of persistent poverty in urban areas have focused on the experiences and problems of Blacks. By far the most influential recent analysis of persistent poverty among urban minorities is William Julius Wilson's book The Truly Disadvantaged (1987). One reason existing literature has focused on the experiences of Blacks is that data sources on poverty are generally richer for Blacks than for Hispanics. For example, the principal longitudinal data source for analysis of the persistence of poverty is the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. This survey contains fewer than 300 Hispanic respondents in total, far too few to permit meaningful analyses.[1] The literature on the economic problems of Blacks is far richer in all areas than the comparable literature on

Hispanics. Thus, scholars and public policy experts became aware of the problems of persistent poverty and underclass behavior in the Black community.

This paper summarizes what is known or can be surmised about the nature and causes of persistent poverty among Hispanics. The usefulness of Wilson's model of the Black underclass for understanding Hispanic poverty will be assessed. The analysis will proceed in four steps. The first is a review of the overall literature on persistent poverty. This survey will consider both documentary literature describing persistent poverty and analytic and descriptive literatures discussing the emergence of an urban underclass. Second is a more in-depth consideration of Wilson's model of the emergence of a persistently poor Black urban underclass and of the applicability of this model to Hispanics. Several major factors distinguishing the experiences of Blacks and Hispanics will be identified. Thirdly, characteristics and situations of Blacks and Hispanics in three very poor neighborhoods of Denver, Colorado, are compared using data from the 1980 Census. This comparison confirms some significant differences in the experiences of Blacks and Hispanics in these environments. Fourthly, a profile of the overall population at risk of persistent poverty in the Denver metropolitan area was developed and will be discussed. This profile also suggests significant differences in the etiology of persistent poverty among Blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Whites. The paper concludes with evidence showing that a great priority should be placed on improving available data and theory concerning Hispanic persistent poverty.

It should be pointed out that the bulk of the discussion and evidence will apply to Chicanos: Hispanics of Mexican origin.[2] Chicanos are the single largest group of Hispanics in the nation as a whole. They are predominant among Denver's Hispanics. Denver's Chicanos are unusual in the sense that recent immigration from Mexico to Denver has been very limited. As of 1980, 90 percent of Denver's Hispanic residents reported having been born in the United States. The situations of Chicanos in Denver may offer some clues as to the likely future experiences of Chicanos in other southern and western states if

new U.S. immigration policies are successful in stemming the rate of undocumented immigration from Mexico.

This paper focuses on poverty as it existed in 1980. Denver's economy was booming in that year, due in large part to high oil and other raw material prices. The area economy has been hard hit since 1980 by the slumping oil and other extractive industries. Thus, it is likely that the economic status of Blacks and Hispanics in Denver has deteriorated in recent years. The research reported here should be considered exploratory in nature, providing hypotheses for investigation in Denver and in other places. This analysis is being used to guide planning of research initiatives on the problems of persistent poverty in Denver.[3]

Persistent Poverty Among Urban Minorities: A Review of the Literature

Two independent literatures have developed during the past five years that offer useful insight into the nature, dimensions, and causes of persistent poverty among urban minorities. One literature has its roots in sociology and anthropology and argues that an underclass has emerged among urban minorities. Another literature derives from economics. This literature focuses on persistent poverty: that is, chronic poverty extending over periods as long as a decade.

The Underclass as Defined in Behavioral Terms

The concept of the underclass has recently emerged from obscurity into popular journalistic culture. In one of the first significant studies of the underclass, Ken Auletta (1982) defined the underclass as comprised of four groups; "First, are the hostile street and career criminals who openly reject society's dominant values, a surprisingly small number of whom are responsible for the majority of crimes in most cities. The second group consists of the hustlers, those who out of choice or necessity operate in the underground

economy, peddling "hot" goods, reefers, or hard drugs, gambling, and pimping. Although their activities are illegal, unlike the hostile individuals they are usually not violent; frequently they are skilled entrepreneurs. Third are the passive, those have become dependent over the years on welfare and government support. The fourth group is made up of the traumatized--those whose minds have snapped and who have turned to drink or drugs or roam city streets as helpless shopping-bag ladies, derelicts, or sadistic slashers."

The term "underclass" received a second major analysis in popular literature in the Atlantic Monthly, in a series of two articles by Nicholas Lehmann (1986). Lehmann defined the underclass as Blacks living in urban ghettos, generally in persistent poverty and generally dependent for income on welfare or illicit activities. Lehmann's work is an elaboration and recapitulation of a literature developed during the 1960s by Oscar Lewis and others. This earlier literature argued that a culture of poverty had developed among urban minorities that fostered dysfunctional behavior and that was transmitted from parent to child. Lewis' own studies (1961, 1965) focused on this culture in the Puerto Rican and Mexican communities.

More recently, such academic sociologists as William Julius Wilson of the University of Chicago have sought alternative explanations of the urban underclass. Wilson defines the underclass as:

> that heterogeneous grouping of inner-city families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system. Included in this population are persons who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or have dropped out of the labor force altogether; who are long-term public assistance recipients; and who are engaged in street criminal activity and other forms of aberrant behavior (1985: 133).

Wilson does not attribute the problems of the urban underclass to dysfunctional cultural values but rather to life in destructive environments. Wilson argues, for example, that "cultural values do not ultimately determine behavior or success. Rather, cultural values emerge from specific circumstances and life chances and reflect one's position in the class structure. Thus, if underclass

Blacks have low aspirations or do not plan for the future, it is not ultimately the result of different cultural norms but the product of restricted opportunities, a bleak future, and feelings of resignation originating from bitter personal experiences. Accordingly, behavior described as socially pathological and associated with lower-class minorities should be analyzed not as a cultural aberration but as a symptom of class inequality" (p. 158).

As will be discussed below in more detail, Wilson believes environmental factors that have shaped the urban underclass include:

- historic and contemporary discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities;
- the rapid migration of Blacks into urban areas during the 1950s and 1960s, which led to a shortage of opportunity, a variety of deviant, violent behavior, and White antipathy; as well as
- the loss of city economic function, in particular the loss of blue-collar jobs.

Peter Gottschalk and Sheldon Danziger (1986) have developed crude empirical measures of the national underclass. First, they suggest that the underclass be approximated as persons dependent on welfare for long periods of time (seven years or more) and the homeless. They also include the fathers of such welfare families. By this definition, the national underclass is estimated to amount to a maximum of 10 million persons. For purposes of comparison, there were a total of 34 million poor persons in the United States (U. S.) in 1984. Gottschalk and Danzinger's initial definition of the underclass amounts to only 29 percent of the poor according to the U.S. Census (p. 3).

Gottschalk and Danziger also developed what is in effect a much more restrictive a definition for underclass, persons (both poor and nonpoor) living in urban extreme poverty areas. Urban extreme areas are defined as groups of census tracts in which 40 percent or more of residents were poor in 1979, in the one hundred largest cities in the U. S. By this definition, 3.7 million persons could be counted in the underclass. If the definition were further restricted to impoverished persons in such neighborhoods, the number falls to

1.8 million, or 5 percent of the nation's impoverished persons. The 1970 Census provided counts of persons in poverty areas, but only in the nation's fifty largest cities. The population of poverty areas grew by 60 percent in these fifty cities between 1970 and 1980 and the numbers of impoverished residents rose by 75 percent (Gottschalk and Danziger, 1986: 3).

Persistent Poverty and the Underclass

Research on persistent poverty has been primarily conducted by researchers using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID provides regularly updated histories of the economic and family experiences of persons. According to PSID data, an average of 6.8 percent of the U.S. population was impoverished at any given time between 1969 and 1978 (using the official poverty threshold). However, one-quarter (24.4 percent) of the American people were poor for at least one of those ten years. Greg Duncan (1984) and others using these PSID data have defined persistent poverty as being in poverty for eight or more years in a decade. According to this definition, 2.6 percent of the U.S. population was persistently poor between 1969 and 1978. By this definition, persons in persistent poverty comprise about 40 percent of people who are poor at any one time and 10 percent of persons who were poor for at least one year during a decade.

PSID data documents the substantial differences between regional patterns of persistent poverty and the behavioral concept of the "underclass." For example, fully one-third of persistently poor households in the nation in 1978 lived in rural communities; only 15 percent of the overall population did. Sixty-eight percent of the persistently poor lived in the South; only 30 percent of the overall population lived in the South. Indeed, many persistently poor households are poor because of factors altogether unrelated to race and class. Thirty-nine percent of poor heads of households were disabled in 1978 versus 11 percent of all heads of households. Thirty-three percent were elderly while only 13 percent of all heads of households were elderly. Strikingly, however,

almost two-thirds of the persistently poor were Black. In 1978, Blacks comprised only 12 percent of the U.S. population and 42 percent of the overall poverty population.

Two recent papers offer clues as to how the underclass might be defined jointly on the basis of behavioral characteristics and persistent poverty. An unpublished analysis by Robert Reischauer (1987) used PSID data to define the underclass on the basis of persistent poverty and other factors associated with underclass status, such as a poor education, being out of the labor force for long periods, living in a big city, living in a slum neighborhood, and so on. He concludes that the underclass is very small when all of the above factors are taken into account: 0.8 percent of the U.S. population in 1982. If the members of the underclass are also restricted to racial or ethnic minorities, and to persons with feelings of low self-esteem and powerlessness, then the class shrinks to 0.6 percent of the U.S. population, or to fewer than one in four persons in persistent poverty (Reischauer, 1987: Table 3-3). Clearly, in Reishcauer's research, the underclass is a small subset of the persistently poor. Hispanics in turn are estimated to be a small subset of the underclass. Using a broader definition, Hispanics are estimated by Reischauer to comprise only 8 percent of the underclass. When more restrictive definitions are used, this figure shrinks to two percent.

Research by Erol Ricketts and Isabel Sawhill (1988) implies similar conclusions on the basis of a completely different methodology. Sawhill and Ricketts identify four specific behaviors that have been widely identified with the urban underclass:

- female-headed families;
- dropping out of school;
- dependence; and
- male absence from the labor force.

They used these behaviors to identify specific census tracts, which in 1980 exhibited significantly above average rates of all four (p. 323). The great bulk of census tracts with high rates of all four behaviors (termed "underclass" tracts) lay in urban poverty areas (i.e., tracts with poverty rates of 20 percent or more). Sixty-one percent of underclass tracts were in extreme poverty areas (i.e., areas with 1980 poverty rates above 40 percent). However, not all tracts with high poverty rates displayed high rates of all four attributes. Only 28 percent of extreme poverty tracts were classed as underclass tracts. The underclass might then be considered a relatively small subset of urban poverty. Like Reischauer, the analysis by Ricketts and Sawhill concludes that Hispanics are a small part of the underclass, 10 percent in 1980. By contrast, Blacks are estimated to make up 59 percent of this group.

Modeling the Emergence of the Black Underclass

The most influential models created so far to account for the growth of the Black underclass have been developed by William Julius Wilson. Wilson argues that two critical factors underlie the emergence of the Black underclass. The first is a decreased ability of lower-skilled, poorly educated Blacks (particularly males) to obtain good jobs. The second is the rapid out-migration of working, middle-and lower-middle-income Blacks from ghetto neighborhoods during the 1960s and 1970s, leaving behind a mostly low-income population. The result was diminished community stability, reduced support for community organizations, and a loss of effective role models. Together, Wilson argues, these factors have produced a massive loss of resources and opportunities for many lower-class Blacks.

The loss of job opportunities is argued to be the result of an inability of many lower-skilled Black males to cope with urban economic transformations of the postwar period. Since World War II, northern central cities have experienced persistent declines in manufacturing activity, particularly blue-collar work. Net growth in manufacturing jobs has been concentrated in

suburban and nonmetropolitan areas. The office work and service sectors have grown in many central cities, but the new jobs in these industries have seldom been sufficient to counterbalance the loss of manufacturing jobs. The result has been frequent shrinkage of overall city economies.[4] Males have been disproportionate victims of city economic decline because Black men have relied more heavily than Black women on the blue-collar jobs, which have declined most rapidly in numbers (Wilson, 1987: 39-46).

Wilson argues that "concentration effects" have offered a second key force. Concentration effects refer to the effects of large neighborhood concentrations of poverty on the capacity of people and institutions in the neighborhoods to thrive or survive (pp. 46-62). Racial segregation imposed very tight limitations on Black residential choices through 1970. This segregation impeded the ability of middle-income Black families to leave lower-income Black ghettos. The result was that ghettos were socially and economically diverse. This diversity provided an economic base for community organizations, public and private, in the Black ghetto. Wilson believes that the civil rights innovations of the 1960s and 1970s relaxed racial constraints on the neighborhood choices of Blacks and permitted large-scale outmovement from Black city neighborhoods by middle-class or lower-middle class residents.

In assessing Wilson's model, it should be kept in mind that little hard evidence suggests fundamental improvements in Black segregation in recent years. Ann Schnare has documented (using "exposure" based indexes) that average levels of segregation fell slightly in metropolitan areas during the 1970s. Average levels of Black segregation in 1980 were equivalent to those prevailing in 1960 (Yinger, 1987: 58-59). The stability of overall racial segregation could conceal a sorting out of Blacks by socioeconomic class. Wilson argues that middle-class Black out-migrants from ghetto neighborhoods took with them economic resources needed to support community-based institutions, such as stores, churches, schools, fraternities, sororities, and so forth. Middle-class persons also took with them role models for lives based on productive work and stable families.

The two-parent Black family in particular is argued to have been weakened by ghetto conditions. The loss of well-paying blue-collar work diminished the capacity of Black men to support families and the ability of Black women to find economically stable marriage partners. Wilson believes that the loss of "marriageable" Black males, that is, Black men with stable work and income bases, has been largely responsible for the increasing number of Black families headed by women, the increasing proportions of Black children born out of wedlock, and the rising rates of welfare dependence in the ghettos.

The Wilson Model and Chicanos

Four factors shape or limit the applicability of the Wilson model to Chicanos. The following is a description of the four factors: neighborhood segregation and concentration effects; the Chicano Family; immigration; and the economic context.

Neighborhood Segregation and Concentration Effects

Chicanos have experienced different patterns of neighborhood segregation than have Blacks. A recent study examined patterns of housing segregation and discrimination encountered by Blacks and Hispanics in Denver, Houston, and Phoenix (James, McCummings, and Tynan, 1984). Hispanics in all three areas are predominantly Chicanos. Indexes of segregation estimated in this study are presented in Graph 1. As can be seen, in 1970 segregation in Denver and Houston was three times as severe for Blacks as it was for Hispanics. Blacks in Phoenix were also more segregated than Hispanics, though the differences were much smaller. Moreover the segregation of Blacks fell markedly in these Sunbelt cities between 1970 and 1980, while that of Hispanics rose significantly in Houston and declined only marginally in Denver and Phoenix. In the Denver metropolitan area during the 1970s, for example, a quantitative index of the segregation of Blacks fell by one-third, indicating significant

progress toward integration. By contrast, the segregation of Hispanics in Denver fell by only 13 percent. By 1980, Hispanics in Phoenix were more segregated than Blacks due to rapid Black progress toward integration in that city.

Graph 1. Segregation Indexes for Racial and Ethnic Groups in the Denver, Houston, and Phoenix Metropolitan Areas, 1970 and 1980



Graph 1 adapted from Table 1.

Detailed studies of neighborhood segregation of Hispanics by economic class or strata have found that patterns of Hispanic segregation have long resulted in a much greater separation of Hispanics by economic class than has been the case for Blacks. Put another way, economic mobility for Hispanic families has been matched by geographic mobility to a greater extent than has been permitted for Blacks. For instance, Douglas Massey and Brendon Mullan investigated patterns of neighborhood shifts in a number of U.S. metropolitan areas during the 1960s. They concluded:

> Spatial assimilation occurs as Hispanics of high socioeconomic status enter predominantly Anglo areas located throughout the urban environment. Hispanic SES (socioeconomic status) is positively related to distance from an established area and to probability of contact with

> Anglos. Our estimated structural model of Hispanic assimilation implies that increased education, occupational status, and income will lead to geographic mobility which promotes spatial assimilation with Anglos.
>
> In contrast, Blacks face strong barriers to spatial assimilation which cause them to be spatially isolated from both Anglos and Hispanics. Increasing Black social status apparently does not reduce the social distance that Anglos perceive between themselves and Blacks. Areas of potential Black settlement are restricted to tracts adjacent to existing Black neighborhoods, and entry of Blacks into these areas is almost always due to increasing socioeconomic characteristics of the entering Blacks. In a sense, the ghetto follows upwardly mobile Blacks as they attempt to assimilate spatially (1984: 868-869).

Recent research by Michael White (1987, Chapter 4) has shown that, as a result of this spatial assimilation process, poor Hispanics appear to be more isolated from nonpoor Hispanics than are poor Blacks from nonpoor Blacks, or poor Whites from nonpoor Whites. Unfortunately, White did not measure the social isolation of poor Hispanics or Blacks from all nonpoor households. This broader measure of isolation may be more relevant in producing the concentration effects hypothesized by Wilson. Nevertheless, these data imply the possibility of extreme isolation of poor Hispanics. In Wilson's jargon, concentration effects may be larger for Hispanics than for Blacks.

The differences in the levels and trends in segregation of Blacks and Hispanics have complex implications for the strength of community-based organizations in Chicano barrios and Black ghettos. Because Chicanos are more spread out geographically, they have had more access to mainstream businesses and organizations. This would tend to weaken community-based organizations in lower income Chicano neighborhoods.

However, Hispanics are predominantly Catholic and the Catholic church has greater ability to shift resources among parishes than the Protestant church; thus, church services may be stronger for barrio residents.

The Chicano Family

There is a variety of evidence that the structure and functions of the Chicano family differ from those of the Black family. Available evidence implies that Chicano families are influenced by three values (Alvirez and Bean, 1976):

- familism—a basic recognition of the importance of families to all their members, including extended family members and sometimes godparents;
- male dominance; and
- subordination of younger persons to older ones.

Joan Moore has depicted a family structure in which the needs of the family collectively may be met before those of individuals and in which the family may serve as a place of refuge in times of need (Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, 1970: 351). She has also found a great value placed on women's roles as mothers, and a consequent high rate of fertility (pp. 185-196). Alfredo Mirande has summarized the importance of familism this way: "The family is thus seen as a warm and nurturing unit that provides support throughout the lifetime of the individual. In times of stress or when problems arise one typically turns to the family for help rather than to outside agencies. Sharing and cooperation are encouraged and valued not only among children but among adult family members. Anglo-controlled agencies find it difficult to understand why Chicanos are leery of outside help. . . or why badly needed resources are distributed to more needy family members. Help patterns are clearly established, and it is not uncommon for family members to pool resources to purchase large or expensive items such as a house or a car" (1985: 151-152).

In contrast, literature on the Black family has argued that Black families tend to be matriarchal or egalitarian (Moynihan, 1965: J.L. McAdoo, 1981). Some experts have also suggested that family loyalties and responsibilities are, among Blacks, defined by consanguinity more powerfully than along conjugal lines. Niara Sudarkasa has argued that "historically among Black Americans the concept of 'family' meant first and foremost relationships created by 'blood' rather than by marriage. Children were socialized to think in terms of obligations to parents (especially mothers), siblings, and others defined as 'close kin.' Obligations to 'outsiders' who would include prospective spouses and in-laws, were definitely less compelling. Once a marriage took place, if the

demand of the conjugal relationship came into irreconcilable conflict with consanguineous commitments, the former would often be sacrificed. Instead of interpreting instances of marital instability as prima facie evidence of family instability, it should be realized that the fragility of the conjugal relationship could be a consequence or corollary of the stability of the consanguineous family network. Historically, such groups survived by nurturing a strong sense [of] responsibility among members and by fostering a code of reciprocity which could strain relations with persons not bound by it" (1981: 49-50).

Recent statistical analysis of household formation, fertility, and marriage has found very significant ethnic and racial differences in behavior within Chicago's poverty areas. Mark Testa (1988) has found that young Mexican-American women are less likely to have children independently of marriage than are young Black women. Single Mexican-American women who did become pregnant were found to expect their partner to marry them more than did Black women. In Testa's research, slightly less than half of the Mexican-American females had expected to marry the father of their first child. Over a four-year observation period, 45 percent did marry the father of their first child. By contrast, only 30 percent of young Black women expected to marry the father, and only 18 percent actually married. (Strikingly, only 10 percent of Black girls reported they did not expect to marry.) Black parental families appear to offer greater support to young single daughters who bear children. Adolescent Black girls under 18 in Chicago who bear children are more likely than are similar Mexican-American girls to stay at home with parents or grandparents and to stay in school. Whatever their race, such girls who left home and set up independent households with welfare support were more likely to drop out of school (Testa, 1988: 27). It is possible that the Chicano girls receive less support from their families because of disapproval of premarital child bearing.

Marriage, children, and traditional family values are not immutable and independent of structural factors. For example, Maxine Baca Zinn has suggested that one reason for the strength of familism as a value among Mexican Americans

is "the lack of external support systems available to Chicanos in American society" (1979: 67). However, cultural values may be an independent force shaping Chicano behavior regarding marriage, childrearing, and welfare utilization.

Immigration

The third factor differentiating Hispanic experience in the inner city is immigration. Net Black migration to central cities of the North stopped in many areas during the 1970s. Overall, the nation's central cities have experienced accelerating out-migration of Blacks since 1970. Black net out-migration from central cities amounted to 243,000 between 1970 and 1975; 439,000 between 1975 and 1980; and 771,000 between 1980 and 1984. Suburban rings of metropolitan areas were the predominant destination of Black migrants, receiving net in migration of 1,141,000 Blacks between 1980 and 1984 (O'Hare, 1987: Table 3). Equally important, net Black migration from the South to the North and West also ceased around 1970. Since 1970, both the Northeast and Midwest have experienced small net out-migration of Blacks while the South has experienced net immigration, probably for the first time since the Civil War (O'Hare, 1987: Table 2).

During the 1950s and 1960s, Black migration to northern cities was a major force in shaping life in Black ghettos. Migrants and their children brought vitality, hope, and an eagerness to work to the ghetto. Studies have shown that second-generation Black migrants to northern cities generally failed to match the economic status of their parents, presumably in part because the realities of discrimination and limits on opportunities suppressed aspirations and efforts to succeed (Wilson, 1987). Black migrants also boosted housing demands in established ghetto neighborhoods, forestalling housing abandonment and supporting neighborhood shops and stores. High housing prices prevailed in ghetto neighborhoods, where housing shortages emerged (Kain and Quigley, 1975). It is possible that the decrease of Black migration to northern ghettos is

one factor exacerbating the economic collapse of some Black ghetto neighborhoods. Wilson has argued that migrants were also generally young men and women and thus contributed to social instability, unemployment, crime, and out-of-wedlock births (1987: 142).

Reliable information on the scale of Mexican immigration in unavailable, due to the large numbers of undocumented migrants, but the scale of immigration is very large. Thomas Muller has estimated that over one million immigrants from Mexico entered the U.S. between 1970 and 1980 (Muller and Espenshade, 1985). Mexican migrants are young and, like other immigrants, strongly motivated to work. Moreover, Mexican migrants, particularly the undocumented, are predominantly male and tend to move to communities with substantial Chicano populations. Friendship and family ties are important in shaping these migration streams.

Chicano immigration streams could affect all aspects of barrio life. Immigrants could raise the likelihood of employment among Chicano males (immigrants as well as native born) because of their motivation to work. Immigrants could also reduce job opportunities for native-born Chicanos by competing for limited numbers of available jobs and by depressing wage levels in businesses and occupations highly reliant on immigrant workers. Mexican immigration could also have important effects in the Chicano family, particularly in lower-income barrio neighborhoods. Immigrants replenish the number of Chicano males who are employed and available for marriage. Indeed, undocumented workers have a strong incentive to marry U.S. citizens, because such a marriage opens up the door to a resident alien status and a "green card." Immigrants also refresh traditional Chicano family values and could maintain such values as significant shapers of the Chicano family. Alfredo Mirande argues:

> People tend to migrate to areas where they anticipate work and where relatives, friends, or acquaintances reside. This continual influx of new arrivals maintains and reinforces cultural bonds that resist the push toward integration and Americanization. Unlike European immigrants who found themselves isolated from a

distant homeland, Chicanos are not far from their native roots. The influence of Mexican culture and the Spanish language are therefore ongoing (1985: 164).

The Economic Context

Chicanos are disproportionately concentrated in cities of the Southwest. In 1980, nine out of ten Mexican Americans lived in the southern or western regions of the U.S.; the comparable figure for non-Hispanic Whites was less than 50 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census). The economic structures of metropolitan areas in the Southwest are much different on average from those of the Northeast and Midwest. Overall rates of metropolitan growth in jobs and population are higher in the Southwest. The pace of metropolitan spatial decentralization is slower, because cities of the Southwest are generally newer; many were built during the years when the auto and truck were the dominant transport technologies. (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980).

Because Chicanos are disproportionately concentrated in new Sunbelt cities, they have not been victims of economic dislocation to the same extent as Blacks have been in the northern cities. Graph 2 describes recent economic trends in 26 major cities of the Southwest between 1972 and 1982.

The economies of the 26 cities included in this analysis offered 4.3 million jobs in 1982 in manufacturing, services, wholesale trade and retail trade. This was up to 50 percent since 1972. None of the 26 cities experienced overall employment declines in these four sectors during the decade. Manufacturing jobs in general and production jobs in particular rose strongly in these cities, while declining in large numbers of northeastern and midwestern cities. Only two of the 26 cities experienced a decline in manufacturing jobs and only five lost manufacturing production jobs; jobs in retail trade surged by 38 percent during the period; and none of the cities lost retail jobs. Service employment rose most rapidly - up 120 percent. Much of this service growth is attributable to enlarged census definitions of the service sector. Even without

the new definition; however, the service sector would have grown in these expanding economies.

Graph 2. Economic Context: Employment Change by Sector
in 26 Large Southwestern Cities



Graph 2 adapted from Table 3.

Conditions in Denver's Poorest Neighborhoods

By and large, the data needed to judge the importance of the factors distinguishing Chicano and Black experience in inner-city neighborhoods are unavailable. Such data would include detailed information regarding attitudes, geographic and economic mobility, work patterns, family structure, and the roles of community-based organizations in people's lives. However, data from the 1980 Census describing neighborhood residents provide a starting place for exploratory analysis. In 1980, seven census tracts in Denver had poverty rates exceeding 40 percent and thus qualified as extreme poverty areas. These tracts are delimited in Figure 1. Specifically, an examination of social and economic patterns in these neighborhoods provides insight into the possible roles of concentration effects, job market conditions and other factors in producing poverty and deprivation among neighborhood residents.

The seven tracts are grouped by the city of Denver into three neighborhoods: Five Points, Auraria-Lincoln Park, and Sun Valley. Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley comprise three tracts to the south and west of the business district. Sun Valley is separated from Auraria-Lincoln Park by the Platte River and Interstate 25. Sun Valley is largely an area of low-income public housing lying within an industrial area. Auraria-Lincoln Park is among Denver's oldest neighborhoods. It is a mixed-use area including industry, public housing, and modest one-family homes. In the analysis that follows, Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley will be combined. Both are predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. Five Points comprises four census tracts to the east of Denver's central business district. Five Points contains some of Denver's oldest Black areas. It also contains a major Hispanic community centered on Curtis Park.

The racial and ethnic composition of neighborhood residents is profiled in Table 3. Together, the neighborhoods were the homes of 18,252 persons in 1980. Hispanics were the single largest group, comprising slightly more than half the population. Blacks made up around one-quarter. Non-Hispanic Whites amounted to 14 percent. The west-side neighborhoods, Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley, were almost three-fourths Hispanic. Five Points is a much more ethnically heterogeneous area, with about equal numbers of Blacks and Hispanics. An examination of the Black and Hispanic populations of these neighborhoods provides a basis for comparing the circumstances that are associated with extreme poverty among these groups. Five Points contained 17 percent of impoverished Black families in Denver in 1980. Altogether, Five Points, Auraria-Lincoln Park, and Sun Valley contained 21 percent of the city's impoverished Hispanic families.

Graphs 3 and 4 describe several indicators of the economic status of Blacks and Hispanics in the neighborhoods. The economic status of both minority groups was clearly very low in the neighborhoods in 1980. Fifty-nine percent of Black families were below the poverty line. More than two-thirds of Black families with children were below the poverty line. In comparison, poverty rates for Hispanic families were generally lower. The Hispanic poverty rate in

Five Points among Hispanic families with children was 44 percent, and was 56 percent in the west side neighborhoods. The large role of low-income housing in Auraria-Lincoln Park and in Sun Valley is reflected in relatively lower economic status among Hispanics in those west side neighborhoods. Every indicator suggests that Hispanics are in better economic shape in Five Points than they are in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley. Even so, overall poverty rates of Hispanics in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley were lower than those among Blacks in Five Points.

Minority residents of these neighborhoods are also striking for their extent of underclass behaviors (Table 5). Compared to the figures for all residents of Denver, Blacks in Five Points were twice as likely to be out of the labor force (persons 16 or older), five times more likely to be on welfare, and twice as likely to have less than a high school education. Neighborhood school dropout rates among Black persons 16 to 19 were almost twice the city average. The figures for Hispanics show similar types of disparities. Again, relative to average figures for the city as a whole, Hispanics in Five Points, Auraria-Lincoln Park, and Sun Valley were twice as likely to be out of the labor force, four times more likely to be on welfare, and more than three times more likely to have less than a high school education. Hispanic families in the neighborhoods were more than twice as likely to be headed by women. Hispanic teenagers 16 to 19 years old in the neighborhoods were twice as likely to be dropouts as were teenagers in the city as a whole.[5]

The Wilson model would appear to suggest generally similar behavior and problems of disadvantaged people within a given neighborhood and economic environment because such people face generally similar neighborhood conditions and job market conditions. However, Blacks in Five Points showed higher levels of three of the five underclass behaviors than did Hispanics in either Five Points or Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley. Disparities were particularly large in the frequency of female-headed families. In Five Points, Black families were almost twice as likely to be headed by women as were Hispanic families in the neighborhood. Greater proportions of Black adults were out of the labor force.

Black households in the neighborhoods were also much more likely to be receiving welfare income. Hispanics in the neighborhoods stand out as exhibiting very low levels of education. Over 80 percent of Hispanics 25 or older had less than a high school education in 1980. The comparable figure for Blacks was far lower (though still high): 56 percent. Given the poor average education levels of Hispanics in the neighborhoods, it is striking that high school

Graph 3. Indicators of the Economic Status of Black Residents of Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods, 1980


Female householder w/own children under 18
Female householder
With own children under 18
Families in poverty
Households w/1979 income less than $5000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Percent
% in Five Points
% in City of Denver

Graph 3 adapted from Table 4.

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the frequency of female-headed families. In Five Points, Black families were almost twice as likely to be headed by women as were Hispanic families in the neighborhood. Greater proportions of Black adults were out of the labor force. Black households in the neighborhoods were also much more likely to be receiving welfare income. Hispanics in the neighborhoods stand out as exhibiting very low levels of education. Over 80 percent of Hispanics 25 or older had less than a high school education in 1980. The comparable figure for Blacks was far lower (though still high): 56 percent. Given the poor average education levels of Hispanics in the neighborhoods, it is striking that high school

Graph 4. Indicators of the Economic Status of Hispanic Residents of Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods, 1980


Female householder w/own children under 18
Female householder
With own children under 18
Families in poverty
Households w/1979 income less than $5000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Percent
% in Five Points
%in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley
%in City of Denver

Graph 4 adapted from Table 4.

dropout rates among persons 16 to 19 years old in the neighborhoods were not significantly higher among Hispanics than among Blacks. The presence of Mexican immigrants may reduce average education levels among older Hispanics

in the neighborhoods. Mexican immigrants have very low average levels of education. Five Points has a significant immigrant community among Hispanics. In 1980, 23 percent of neighborhood Hispanics were born outside the United States; however, immigration is clearly not the whole story. Hispanic education levels were very poor in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley, yet immigrants comprised only 11 percent of Hispanics in the area in 1980.[6]

There is no altogether acceptable empirical measure of "concentration effects," as defined by Wilson. One crude but useful indicator is the extent of socio-economic disparities between conditions in these extreme poverty areas and those conditions prevailing in the city as a whole. The more disparate are conditions and behavior in the extreme poverty neighborhoods, the more likely it is that a new "class" of persons has emerged in the neighborhood.

Surprisingly, given previous research on Hispanic segregation, the various indicators of socioeconomic status suggest that "concentration" effects are not as significant among Chicanos as they are among Blacks. The living conditions of Hispanics in these impoverished neighborhoods are not highly differentiated from conditions for Hispanics elsewhere in the city. Among Blacks, poverty and underclass behaviors are much more concentrated and intense in these neighborhoods than elsewhere in city. Tables 4 and 5 describe the incidence of poverty and underclass behavior in the city as a whole, as well as in the two neighborhoods. Without exception, socioeconomic disparities between the neighborhoods and the city are larger for Blacks than they are for Hispanics. Among Blacks, poverty was three times higher in Five Points than it was among Blacks in the city as a whole. Among Hispanics, the neighborhood poverty rates were about twice the city average. Women heading households with young children have high rates of poverty everywhere. Even among this more economically homogeneous group, neighborhood-city disparities were larger for Blacks: poverty rates among this group of Black families were 1.7 times as high in Five Points as in the city; this group of Hispanic families was only 1.1 times as likely to be poor in Five Points as in the city as a whole. Welfare dependence and the probability of being out of the labor force were,

among Blacks, about twice as high in five Points as in Denver as a whole. Hispanics exhibited 30 to 40 percent higher rates of these behaviors in Five Points than in the city. Strikingly, high school dropout rates were almost three times higher among Blacks in Five Points than among Blacks in the city, while Hispanic dropout rates showed little difference between the neighborhoods and the city. Disparities in the incidence of female-headed families were also higher for Blacks.

The principal factors associated with the very low economic status of Blacks in these extreme poverty neighborhoods are the greater frequency of the female-headed family among Blacks relative to Hispanics and the greater presence of males in the Hispanic family and in the work force. In 1980, Black families in Five Points were twice as likely to be headed by women as were Hispanic families in the same neighborhood. Fully three-fourths of the Black families in Five Points with children under 18 were headed by women. The comparable figure for Hispanics was 39 percent, half as large. Even in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley, an area with a heavy presence of low-income housing projects, Hispanic families were far less likely to be headed by women than were Black families in Five Points. Rates of poverty among all groups of female-headed families in the neighborhoods were very high in 1979, ranging (for families with children under 18) from a high of 77 percent for Hispanics in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley to a low of 60 percent for Hispanics in Five Points. The poverty rate for such families among Blacks in Five Points was 76 percent. If the composition of families by family type had been the same for Blacks and Hispanics, and poverty rates had remained unchanged for each type of family, disparities between Blacks and Hispanics in overall poverty rates would have been much reduced.

There are several indicators of the greater roles of Hispanic males in Hispanic life in the neighborhoods (Table 6). In 1980, only 39 percent of the Black population 16 or over in Five Points were men, compared to 51 percent for Hispanics. Half of the employed Blacks 16 or more in Five Points were men. The comparable figure for Hispanics in the area was 64 percent. William Julius

Wilson has employed the concept of the "marriageable" male to help account for the different family structure of groups. He defines a marriageable male as an employed male. Wilson has examined trends over time in the number of employed men per women (the so-called male marriageable pool index) in the nation and in its regions. The index (see Table 6) is strongly correlated with ethnic family structure in the neighborhoods. The index was only 0.3 for Blacks in Five Points and was twice as high for Hispanics in the neighborhood (0.6). The index was lower for Hispanics in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley (0.5). The frequency of female-headed families in neighborhoods tracks these index values very closely.

The relatively low male populations of these neighborhoods, particularly among Blacks, are difficult to explain and should be the focus of much more research. It is not addressed in Wilson's model. One possible explanation is that Census data severely understate the presence of minority males in these poverty areas. Two additional factors may reduce the actual numbers of both Black and Hispanic males in the extreme poverty neighborhoods: the greater likelihood of incarceration for minority males and their lower life expectancy. Of Black women in the neighborhoods who reported themselves to have been married, almost one-third (32 percent) reported themselves to be widows. This is striking because the population of the neighborhood is generally fairly young. Only one in five Black residents reported themselves to be 55 or more in 1980. No data are available on the incarceration rates of neighborhood residents. A recent study of the low-income population of Washington, D.C., found that as much as three-quarters of the gender imbalance among impoverished young adults 18-29 could be accounted for by the higher incarceration rates of younger men compared to young women (Grier and Grier, 1988: 18).

With respect to shortages of employed males, Wilson emphasizes the limited job opportunities for minority men from poverty neighborhoods. In 1980, Hispanic males were more likely to be employed than were Black males in Denver's extreme poverty areas (Table 7). Male labor force participation rates were higher for Hispanic males than for Black males. The disparity was

particularly large in Five Points, where 67 percent of Hispanic males were in the labor force, versus 56 percent of Black males. Participation rates of Hispanic females were also somewhat higher than were participation rates for Black females. Unemployment rates were much the same for the two groups. The fact that Hispanic and Black employment experiences differ so significantly among residents of the same neighborhoods implies that changing economic structures and geographic access to jobs are far from the whole story.

It is striking that the barriers to obtaining work that have been emphasized by Wilson--poor education and reliance on blue-collar jobs--are greater for Denver's Hispanics than they appear to be for Blacks. Denver's economy is service or office oriented and as in many other cities, the blue-collar sector of Denver's economy is shrinking. Blacks in Five Points held jobs consistent with a modern urban economy. In 1980, most Black workers in Five Points held either professional, managerial, or administrative support jobs (42 percent) or service positions (39 percent). Only 20 percent held blue-collar jobs. By contrast, slightly more than half of Hispanics in Five Points held blue-collar jobs. Over one-third held unskilled or semiskilled production or laborer positions. A significant number of Hispanics also suffered from difficulty with English. Thirty percent of the Hispanics 18 or over in Five Points reported knowing little or no English, as did twenty percent of the Hispanics in Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley. Recent research has shown that poor English skills are extremely potent barriers to economic opportunity in the United States (James and Applebaum, 1986).

One possible explanation of the lack of work success of Blacks is that they may encounter somewhat more labor force discrimination than do Hispanics in Colorado and most other places in the United States. To be sure, no studies have directly observed such differences in discrimination. Available evidence is based on statistical analysis of earning differences between Blacks and Hispanics and the earnings of non-Hispanic Whites. These analyses measure differences in overall earnings that can be explained by objective differences in worker qualifications; unexplained earnings gaps may be attributable to discrimination.

One recent study found that the average annual earnings of Black males in Colorado's labor market were 28 percent lower in 1979 than were those of equally qualified non-Hispanic White males. The equivalent gap for Hispanic males was 6 percent (James, 1984). If accurate, such an apparently significant difference in discrimination could account for some of the employment experiences of Blacks and Hispanics in the neighborhoods. Another possible explanation of the different work situation of Hispanics in Denver is that community sources of support from friends, family, the church, or other community-based organizations may be greater for Chicanos than Blacks. Such support could help Chicano workers plug more effectively into job networks. As of 1980, almost 60 percent of Hispanics in Five Points had lived in the same house for at least five years. The comparable figure for Blacks was 40 percent. Greater social stability among Hispanics in Five Points could enhance social support networks. However, stability is not so evident among Hispanic residents of Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley. As of 1980, only one-third (32 percent) of neighborhood Hispanics had been in the same house for five years or more.

The disparity between Black and Hispanic situations in Denver's impoverished neighborhoods is substantial enough to cast doubt on the applicability of Wilson's basic model to analysis of Hispanic poverty. With respect to work, the model may understate the importance of racial and ethnic discrimination. With respect to family structure, the overall shortage of minority males in extreme poverty areas is at least as significant as their employment status in explaining the lack of "marriageable men." It could be argued that the paucity of Black males-especially employed males--in Five Points is a result of Black family structure and not its cause. Minority men living without children are unlikely to be in poverty. Such men may have a broader range of neighborhood choices than do impoverished female-headed families with children. Minority men could thus move away from the problems of impoverished minority women and children. One researcher has suggested that early fertility among Black women could reduce their "marriageability"

compared to childless women and lead marriage-minded or family-minded Black males to seek out other women (Testa, 1988). Married-couple families would also have more opportunities to move out of heavily impoverished neighborhoods, such as Five Points, than would female-headed families.

Persistent Poverty in Denver

There is a legitimate question whether or not a Hispanic "underclass" exists in Denver or other places, particularly among Chicanos. Indeed, as has been seen, recent national estimates of the size and composition of the national underclass have estimated that Hispanics may comprise very small or even trivial proportions of this group (Reischauer, 1987; Ricketts and Sawhill, 1988). Data from Denver that will be presented in this section show that persistent poverty is a problem for Hispanics. However, the characteristics of persistently poor Hispanics imply a lesser prevalence of underclass behavior than among persistently poor Blacks.

Panel survey data following individuals over time are the most reliable basis for judging the persistence of a person's experience with poverty. Retrospective data in which people are asked to report their past poverty experiences can also be useful.[9] Neither type of data is currently available for Denver. Judgments about the numbers of persistently poor persons in the Denver metro area are based on analyses of persons at risk of persistent poverty. For purposes of this exploratory report, persons at risk of persistent poverty are persons who

- were in poverty in 1980, according to the Census;
- were of working age, 18 to 64; and
- faced three or more significant barriers to economic opportunity (or "strikes").

Barriers to economic opportunity are defined as factors that reduce a person's opportunities for productive work or that foster a life of economic dependence on welfare. A review of the literature on persistent poverty and welfare dependence suggested a focus on the following barriers:

- less than a high school education;
- work disability;
- out of labor force;
- long-term unemployment;
- Black or Hispanic;
- female;
- single female parent of young children;
- welfare dependence; and
- immigrant with limited English skills.

Working-age persons in poverty in the metro area in 1980 who exhibited three or more of these characteristics were counted as at risk of persistent poverty.[10]

In 1980, almost 22,000 (2 percent) of working-age residents of the Denver metro area, were in poverty and faced sufficient barriers to economic opportunity that they were at risk of persistent poverty (Table 8). Altogether, about 76,000 metro residents were in poverty in that year. Thus, slightly more than one quarter of impoverished persons were classified as at risk of persistent poverty. This is similar to the national relationship between rates of persistent poverty and rates of overall annual poverty found by researchers using PSID data. As has been seen, Greg Duncan has classified 2.6 percent of American heads of households as persistently poor, while 6.8 percent were poor on average during his study period.

Being at risk of persistent poverty was comparatively rare among non-Hispanic Whites and among males in the Denver metropolitan area. As Graph 5 shows, only 0.9 percent of non-Hispanic Whites were at risk. Even fewer males

were at risk of persistent poverty (0.6 percent). Over eight percent of Blacks and almost eight percent of Hispanics were at risk of persistent poverty in 1980, nine times the rate for non-Hispanic Whites. Indeed, over half of impoverished Blacks and Hispanics were classed as at risk of persistent poverty. Only about one in seven non-Hispanic Whites in poverty were classed as at risk of persistent poverty. Put another way, poverty appears to be much more persistent among poor Blacks and Hispanics than among poor non-Hispanic Whites.

Graph 5. Percent of Persons in Poverty and at Risk of Persistent Poverty in the Denver Metropolitan Area, by Race, 1980



Graph 5 adapted from Table 8.

Tables 9, 10, and 11 describe the working-age persons at risk of persistent poverty in the metropolitan area. Separate figures are presented for Blacks, Hispanics, and for non-Hispanic Whites. The most striking characteristic of these populations is their domination by women: 85 percent in 1980. Persistent poverty is also largely a problem of families. More than three-fourths of the persons at risk of persistent poverty lived with children, other relatives, or spouses in 1980; only one in five (22 percent) lived in households comprised of friends, roommates, or partners to whom they were not

married. Female-headed families with children were the single most common type of family. Husband-wife families were far less common, and persons living alone were comparatively rare. Only 16 percent of the households of the adults at risk of persistent poverty were comprised of only one person.

Typically, in Denver and elsewhere, the overall poverty population is younger than is the population at large. In Denver, for example, 38 percent of working-age adults in poverty in 1980 were 18 to 24 years old. The comparable figure for the non-poor adults was only 21 percent. This is not surprising, because earning power is less and family responsibilities are frequently great among relatively young people. However, the adults at risk of persistent poverty are older on average than is the overall poverty population. Almost a third (31 percent) of persons at risk were 45 to 64 years old. Such persons comprised only 19 percent of the overall poverty population of the metropolitan area. One reason adults at risk are older is the presence of a substantial number of older adults disabled from work. One in four persons at risk of persistent poverty reported themselves to be totally disabled from work. Such disabilities were reported by only eight percent of persons in poverty and three percent of the metropolitan area's nonpoor adults.

Table 10 shows that the great bulk (80 percent) of persons at risk of persistent poverty have no relationship to the labor force, and most (57 percent in 1980) are dependent on welfare for more than half of their income. The isolation from work of persons at risk of persistent poverty is strikingly large. Two-thirds didn't work for even a single week in the year before the Census; for comparison, almost two-thirds of the overall population of impoverished persons worked at least some in the year prior to the Census. Doubtless, generally poor education contributes to the dependency of persons at risk. One-third of the persons at risk had a ninth-grade education or less. Only 38 percent had completed high school or beyond (see Table 8).

Hispanics comprise the biggest single group of persons at risk of persistent poverty: 8,400 working-age adults at risk. Almost as many non-Hispanic White adults were at risk, 7,800 persons in 1980. Because Denver

has a relatively small Black population, it is not surprising that Blacks are the smallest of the racial and ethnic groups at risk of persistent poverty--4,500 working working-age adults. Two out of three persons at risk of persistent poverty live in Denver City, the core city of the region.

The problems that produce persistent poverty appear to differ for non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. Disproportionate numbers of non-Hispanic Whites at risk of persistent poverty are people drawn from the labor force by disability. Forty percent of Whites report themselves to be totally disabled from work, versus 14 percent for Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty and 20 percent for Blacks. Whites at risk of persistent poverty are older than are Blacks or Hispanics. It is far from clear that Whites who are at risk of persistent poverty come from any particular class or sector of the community. They are much more geographically dispersed than are minorities. Only 41 percent live in Denver City, for example, while 90 percent of Blacks and 77 percent of Hispanics do.

Of White women at risk of persistent poverty, the great bulk have responsibilities for children (64 percent have two or more), and most (66 percent) head their own households. The figures are similar to those for Blacks and Hispanics. However, it appears that, among Whites, female-headed families are generally the result of divorce or separation, not child bearing or of wedlock. All but 18 percent of non-Hispanic White women at risk of persistent poverty have been married at least once. The comparable figures among Blacks and Hispanics are 31 percent never married and 24 percent never married, respectively. There is also evidence in the Census data that White women at risk of persistent poverty have more ability to remarry following a divorce. Almost one quarter of White women at risk have been married two or more times. Only 16 percent of Black and 11 percent of Hispanic women had been married two or more times (see Table 9).

As was seen in Five Points, the female-headed family is of disproportionate importance in accounting for persistent poverty among Denver's Blacks. Education levels among Blacks at risk were markedly higher

than were those of Whites or Hispanics: 53 percent of Blacks had graduated from high school, versus 45 percent for Whites and 26 percent for Hispanics. Blacks were also more likely to be in the labor force than were Whites at risk of persistent poverty: 29 percent for Blacks, versus 11 percent for Whites and 26 percent for Hispanics. The single factor that stands out as being disproportionately adverse for Blacks is the prevalence among Blacks of the female-headed family. Female-headed families accounted for 58 percent of all Blacks who were at risk of persistent poverty. The comparable figure for all Blacks in the Denver metropolitan area was 24 percent in 1980. The female-headed family was far less prevalent among Whites and Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty: 39 and 38 percent, respectively.

Denver's Hispanics suffer from three special contributors to persistent poverty: generally very poor educations; the presence of significant numbers of immigrants from Mexico and, to a lesser degree, from other Latin American countries; and large families. As was pointed out, neither Denver nor Colorado has been a major destination for Hispanic immigrants. As of 1980, only 9 percent of Hispanics were born outside the United States. Still, 18 percent of Denver's Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty reported themselves to be either foreign citizens or naturalized citizens. Doubtless, the real proportion who were immigrants would be higher, due to an unwillingness of undocumented persons to report their status to the Census Bureau. Very poor educations are a second factor that distinguish Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty from others. Almost three-fourths of the Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty were high school dropouts. In the overall Hispanic population of the metropolitan area, 42 percent of persons 18 to 64 had failed to complete high school. Poor education characterizes native as well as foreign-born Hispanics.

Comparatively large families are of special importance for understanding persistent poverty among Hispanics. Almost one-third (32 percent) of Hispanic women at risk of persistent poverty in 1980 had borne four or more children. Only ten percent had borne no children. Hispanics exhibited somewhat greater fertility than did Blacks at risk, 16 percent of whom had borne no children.

Reflecting the greater number of children and the more common presence of a man in Hispanic families at risk of persistent poverty, Hispanic households tend to be larger than either Black or White families at risk. About 34 percent of Hispanic households at risk of persistent poverty had five or more members, 28 percent of Black and 26 percent of White households were that large.

Of the serious economic barriers prevalent among persistently poor Hispanics, only dropping out of high school has been identified by previous researchers as an "underclass" behavior. High levels of fertility of husband-wife families is not the type of behavior associated by Wilson or other analysts with the underclass. Immigrant status is also independent of the underclass. Thus, the profile of persistent poverty in Denver supports the conclusion that the main causes of persistent poverty among Hispanics lie outside standard models of the underclass.

Recent Trends in the Hispanic Family

Unfortunately, the data examined in this exploratory analysis cannot demonstrate the specific factors producing the different situations of Blacks and Chicanos in Denver. Because research on the origins of persistent poverty among Chicanos and other Hispanics is so deficient, it is difficult to design ameliorative policies.

It is important to note that some data, admittedly crude and fragmentary, imply that Hispanic behavior may be changing rapidly, reducing disparities between Blacks and Hispanics in a number of indicators of underclass behavior. Unfortunately, the available data describe trends only in the nation as a whole and do not distinguish Hispanics by country of origin. As is well known, Hispanic nationality groups are extremely heterogeneous. Puerto Rican family structure and economic status are more similar to those of Blacks than to those of Mexican Americans. Cubans are more similar to non-Hispanic Whites. Thus, national trends in the conditions of Hispanics as a group may be misleading.

Nevertheless, the data are startling enough to warrant consideration and further research.

In the nation as a whole, it appears that changes in the Hispanic family are producing what appears to be a convergence of the Hispanic and Black experiences. National data imply that trends among Blacks toward increasing numbers of female-headed families have reached their peak. Graph 6 demonstrates that between 1980 and 1985, numbers of Black female-headed families grew more slowly than did numbers of White or Hispanic female-headed families.

Graph 6. Recent National Trends in Percent of Female-Headed Families, by Race and Ethnicity



Graph adapted from Table 12.

The proportion of Black families headed by women also rose more slowly than was true for Whites and Hispanics. Strikingly, numbers of female-headed families grew more rapidly among Hispanics than among any other major racial or ethnic group. Specifically, numbers of female-headed Hispanic families rose by 50 percent between 1980 and 1985. This figure may be compared with a growth rate for Black female-headed families of 14 percent. A major reason for this rapid growth is that the Hispanic population of the country was growing

extremely rapidly; that is, there were more female-headed families because there were more Hispanic families of all types. However, the proportion of Hispanic families headed by women also grew more rapidly than it did among either Blacks or Whites, from 25 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1985.

It is noteworthy that similar trends are occurring in the composition of families on welfare. Numbers of Black families receiving welfare or SSI payments were very stable between 1980 and 1985, rising by less than 1 percent. By contrast, numbers of Hispanic female-headed families on welfare or SSI rose 32 percent.

The accelerating growth of Hispanic female-headed households and of welfare dependency adds urgency to the task of improving our understanding of the factors shaping the socioeconomic status of Hispanics in cities, especially the status of Hispanics at risk of persistent poverty.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the evidence from Denver leaves no doubt that persistent poverty among urban Chicanos is significant, and that its origins are poorly understood. The evidence strongly suggests that Wilson's model of the emergence of a Black underclass may have only limited applicability to Chicanos. Wilson's arguments regarding both the "concentration" effects and the "employment opportunity" effects of living in inner-city neighborhoods are weaker for Chicanos than they appear to be for Blacks. That two minority groups in the same neighborhoods should have such different experiences as do Blacks and Chicanos in Denver's impoverished neighborhoods strongly implies that there may be serious gaps in Wilson's model of the emergence of the underclass. Perhaps a better understanding of Chicano poverty would lead to new insights into the origins of the Black underclass as well.

Virtually all the evidence presented in this paper describes matters in only a single city at one point in time. The top priority for research is to investigate these same issues in other cities and to examine how the

circumstances of Blacks and Hispanics have changed over time so as to see if trends also imply different situations and behaviors for Blacks and Hispanics. A strong case can also be made for the collection of in-depth attitudinal and behavioral data needed to figure out the causes of differences between Chicanos and Blacks. Each of these avenues for future research is being actively pursued.

Notes

1. Conversation with Greg Duncan of the University of Michigan Institute for Research on Poverty. The principal book summarizing the implications of this data base is Greg J. Duncan, Years of Poverty/Years of Plenty (1981).

2. The terms Mexican American and Chicano will be used interchangeably in this paper. Hispanic will be used to refer to all persons of Latino origin.

3. This research is being funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and is part of an overall effort designed to stimulate state and local policy changes to ameliorate the problems of persistent poverty.

4. For an analysis of the transformation of metropolitan economies, see Royce Hanson, ed., Rethinking Urban Policy: Urban Development in an Advanced Economy. For an analysis of the linkage between city economic trends and job opportunities, see John D. Kasarda, "Urban Change and Minority Opportunities" (1985).

5. It is not possible to describe the non-Hispanic White residents of these neighborhoods using Census data. In most cases, the Census does not distinguish between Hispanic and non-Hispanic Whites. Most persons in the neighborhoods who report themselves as "White" are Hispanic. An analysis of data for individual census tracts shows that no tract in Denver's poverty areas failed to have high levels of the five underclass indicators. More specifically, levels of a minimum of four of the five indicators were at least 50 percent higher than in the city, in any of the tracts, see the Appendix.

6. Past research has also shown that Hispanic students are more likely to be held back in grades than are other students. Dropout statistics from the Census may understate the degree to which Hispanic youth fail to complete high school. Larger than average proportions of Hispanic youth 16 to 19 who were still in school may have been in lower grades than their ages suggest and thus to have been less likely than others still in school to complete the twelfth grade.

7. A brief summary of characteristics of Denver's economy is presented in Franklin J. James, "Overview of the Denver Economy" (1987b).

8. An intense and inconclusive debate on this issue was waged by economists during the 1960s and 1970s. See John F. Kain, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization" (1968), and Joseph D. Mooney, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment: An Alternative Prospective" (1969). Counter arguments were presented in Bennett Harrison, "Education and Underemployment in the Urban Ghetto" (1972).

9. This approach is proposed for a Denver household survey in Five Points and Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley.

10. Details of this methodology are presented in Franklin J. James, Defining the Underclass in the Denver Metropolitan Area.

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Table 1. Segregation Indexes for Racial and Ethnic Groups in the Denver, Houston, and Phoenix Metropolitan Areas 1970 and 1980(a)

Racial and Ethnic Groups	Denver		Houston		Phoenix	
	1970	1980	1970	1980	1970	1980
Anglos(b)	.380	.262	.517	.421	.041	.206
Blacks	.592	.393	.611	.586	.359	.210
Hispanics	.218	.189	.203	.240	.241	.228
Other races	.012	.009	.009	.031	.106	.108

Source: James, McCummings, and Tynan, 1984.

a) Segregation indexes are "exposure based" or P* indexes. This index is defined as follows:

$$S = \frac{|Ej - P.j}{1 - P.j}$$

where S is the segregation index
jEj is the exposure of group j to itself;
exposure is the proportion of census tract population comprised of group j, for the average members of group j.
P.j is the proportion of regional population comprised by group j.

b) Anglos are defined as non-Hispanic Whites.

Table 2. Economic Context: Employment Change by Sector in 26 Large Southwestern Cities

Economic Sector	Employment (in thousands) 1972	1982	% change	Number of Cities where employment is: Decreasing	Increasing
Manufacturing	1,003	1,357	35.3	2	24
Production Only	647	791	22.1	5	21
Retail Trade	850	1,169	37.6	0	26
Wholesale Trade (a)	366	408	11.5	5	21
Selected Services (b)	602	1,325	120.1	0	26
TOTAL	2,820	4,258	51.0	0	100

(a) 1982 employment data were suppressed for four cities: Corpus Christi, El Paso, Lubbock and Riverside. Employment figures for these cities were omitted from the 1972 figures for wholesale trade.

(b) The definition of selected services is considerably broader for 1982 than for 1972. Thus employment trends exaggerate actual employment growth.

The cities are: Albuquerque, Amarillo, Anaheim, Austin, Colorado Springs, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Fort Worth, Denver, El Paso, Fresno, Houston, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Lubbock, Oakland, Phoenix, Riverside, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Ana, Stockton, Tuscon.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Manufacturing, Retail trade, Wholesale Trade and Selected Services, 1972 and 1982.

Table 3. Racial and Ethnic Composition of Five Points and Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley, 1980

	Five Points Total		Auraria-Lincoln Park & Sun Valley			
	No.	%	No.	%	No	%
Non-Hispanic white	1,591	16	1,039	13	2,630	14
Black	3,991	40	495	6	4,486	25
Hispanic	4,067	40	5,872	72	9,939	54
Other	451	4	746	9	1,197	7
Total	10,100	100	8,152	100	18,252	100

Source: U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Census Tract Data, 1980.

Table 4. Indicators of the Economic Status of Black and Hispanic Residents of Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods, 1980

	Blacks		Hispanics		
	Five Points	Denver City Total	Five Points	Auraria-Lincoln Park and Sun Valley	Denver City Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Households with 1979 income less than $5,000	53	21	44	41	22
Families in poverty	59	21	40	49	23
With own children under 18	68	26	44	56	26
Female householder	69	41	58	71	49
Female householder with own children under 18	76	46	60	77	56

Source: U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Census Tract Data, 1980.

Table 5. Indicators of Underclass Behaviors among Minorities in Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods, 1980

	Blacks		Hispanics			
	Five Points	Denver City Total	Five Points	Auraria-Lincoln Park	Denver City Total	Denver City Total
Underclass Indicators	%	%	%	%	%	%
Persons 16+ out of labor force	58	31	48	53	36	33
Households with welfare income	39	16	28	32	18	7
Persons 25+ with less than 12 years of school	56	30	84	79	57	25
Persons 16-19 not enrolled in school and not high school graduates	37	14	39	40	37	21
Families headed by females	67	36	35	48	26	18

Source: U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Census Tract Data, 1980.

Table 6. Indicators of the Presence of Men in the Black and Hispanic Population of Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods

	Blacks				Hispanics					
	Five Points		Denver City Total		Five Points		Auraria Lincoln Park and Sun Valley		Denver City Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Gender (persons 16 or more)										
Male	952	39	20,103	48	1,172	51	1,637	47	29,731	49
Female	1,511	69	21,856	52	1,110	49	1,845	53	30,887	51
Employed persons 16 or more										
Male	446	50	13,116	51	648	64	851	61	20,532	59
Female	448	50	12,561	49	359	36	553	39	14,519	41
Marriageable Male Index (Employed males 16 or more/females 16 or more)	.30		.60		.58		.46		.66	
Type of Household Head among Families with Own Children under 18										
Married couple	108	21	4,571	52	280	56	440	43	9,571	67
Male head	18	3	478	5	28	6	49	5	593	4
Female head	393	76	3,698	42	194	39	529	52	4,028	28

Table 7. Labor Force Status of Blacks and Hispanics in Denver's Most Impoverished Neighborhoods, 1980

	Blacks		Hispanics		
	Five Points	Denver City Total	Five Points	Auraria Lincoln Park Sun Valley	Denver City Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Labor Force Participation Rates					
Males	56	75	67	62	78
Females	33	63	36	34	51
Unemployment Rates					
Males	17	8	17	16	10
Females	10	8	9	10	7
Occupations of Employed Persons 16 or more					
Professional managerial, technical, or administration support	42	50	19	19	36
Services	39	25	28	34	23
Precision production or craftsperson	6	7	16	13	15
Operatives	5	12	21	19	17
Laborer	9	5	15	15	10
Other	0	1	2	1	1

Source: U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Census Tract Data, 1980

Table 8. Numbers of persons in Poverty and at Risk of Persistent Poverty in the Denver Metropolitan Area, by Sex, Race, and Ethnicity, 1980

	Total All Persons		Males		Females		Non-Hispanic Whites		Blacks		Hispanics		Other	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total	1,101,160	100.0	541,940	100.0	559,220	100.0	912,300	100.0	54,020	100.0	110,220	100.0	24,620	100.0
Persons in Poverty	76,200	6.9	31,900	5.9	44,300	7.9	51,280	5.6	7,940	14.7	13,820	12.5	3,160	12.8
Persons at risk of persistent poverty	21,700	2.0	3,200	0.6	18,500	3.3	7,820	0.9	4,520	8.4	8,400	7.6	960	3.9

Source: Unpublished tabulations of public use microdata from the 1980 Census.

*Persons in poverty with three or more barriers to economic opportunity; barriers to economic opportunity are described in the text.

Table 9. Basic Demographic Characteristics of Persons at Risk of Persistent Poverty in the Denver Metropolitan Area, 1980

	Total		Blacks		Hispanics		Non-Hispanic Whites	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Gender								
Male	3,200	14.7	680	15.0	1,560	18.6	820	10.5
Female	18,500	85.3	3,840	85.0	6,840	81.4	7,000	89.5
Age								
18- 24	5,000	25.3	1,220	27.0	2,480	29.5	1,4	18.7
25- 34	6,400	29.5	1,360	30.1	2,560	30.5	2,280	29.2
35-44	2,980	13.7	740	16.4	1,080	12.9	920	11.8
45-64	6,820	31.4	1,200	26.5	2,280	27.1	3,160	40.4
Citizenship								
Native	19,080	87.9	4,420	97.8	6,920	82.4	7,380	94.4
Naturalized citizen	620	2.9	40	0.9	340	4.0	200	2.6
Foreign citizen	2,000	9.2	60	1.3	1,140	13.6	240	3.1
County of Residence								
Denver	14,320	66.0	4,060	89.8	6,440	76.7	3,220	41.2
Suburbs	7,380	34.0	460	10.1	1,960	23.4	4,600	58.8
Education (highest grade completed)								
11 or less	13,340	61.5	2,140	47.4	6,200	73.9	4,320	55.2
12	5,160	23.8	1,380	30.5	1,620	19.3	2,020	25.8
13 or more	3,200	14.7	1,000	22.1	580	6.9	1,480	18.9

Source: Unpublished tabulations of public use microdata from the 1980 Census.

Table 10. Family Chatacteristics of Working-Age Persons At Risk of Persistent Poverty in the Denver Metropolitan Area, 1980

	Total		Blacks		Hispanics		Non-Hispanic Whites	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Type of Household								
Husband-wife	6,640	30.6	740	16.4	3,700	44.0	1,700	21.7
Male head	940	4.3	260	5.8	380	4.5	200	2.6
Female head	9,100	41.9	2,600	57.8	3,220	38.3	3,060	39.1
Non-family	4,800	22.1	920	20.4	1,000	11.9	2,740	35.0
Other	220	1.0	0	0.0	100	1.2	120	1.5
Presence of Children								
Family with Children under 18	13,100	60.4	2,900	66.2	4,740	56.4	3,720	47.5
Family with no children under 18	3,580	16.5	700	15.5	1,540	18.3	1,240	15.9
Other	5,020	23.1	920	0.4	1,100	13.1	2,860	36.6
For Women Only (18,500):								
Number of children born								
0	2,360	12.8	620	16.1	660	9.6	920	13.1
1	3,660	19.8	640	6.7	1,220	17.8	1,640	23.4
2-3	7,060	38.2	1,360	35.4	2,760	40.3	2,740	39.2
4 or more	5,420	29.3	1,220	31.8	4,640	32.2	1,700	4.3
Number of times married								
0	4,280	23.1	1,180	30.7	1,620	23.7	1,260	18.0
1	11,120	60.1	2,060	53.6	4,440	64.9	4,100	58.6
2 or more	3,100	16.8	600	15.6	780	11.4	1,640	23.4

Source: Unpublished tabulations of public use microdata from the 1980 Census.

Table 11. Economic Characteristics of Working-Age Persons at Risk of Persistent Poverty in the Denver Metropolitan Area, 1980

	Total		Black		Hispanic		Non-White Hispanic	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Labor Force Status								
Employed	3,480	16.1	900	19.9	1,780	21.2	680	8.7
Unemployed	1,020	4.7	400	8.8	380	4.5	160	2.0
Not in labor force	17,200	79.3	3,220	71.2	6,240	74.3	6,980	89.3
Weeks worked 1979								
0	14,600	67.3	2,820	62.4	5,620	66.9	5,380	68.8
Less than 20	2,900	13.4	620	13.7	1,180	14.0	1,180	12.8
20-49	3,180	14.7	680	15.0	1,120	13.3	1,300	16.6
5 or more	1,020	4.7	400	8.8	480	5.7	140	1.8
Disability Status								
Disabled for work	5,340	24.6	920	20.4	1,180	14.0	3,140	40.2
Not disabled for work	16,360	75.4	3,600	79.6	7,220	86.0	4,680	59.8
Percent of income from welfare								
0	7,420	34.2	1,720	38.1	3,000	35.7	2,440	31.2
Less than 50	1,860	8.6	300	6.6	380	4.5	1,160	14.8
50 or more	12,420	57.2	2,500	55.3	5,020	59.8	4,220	54.0

Source: Unpublished tabulations of public use microdata from the 1980 Census.

Table 12. Recent National Trends in Number of Female-Headed Families, by Race and Ethnicity

	Families (000s)			Female-Headed Families(000s)			Percent of Families Headed by Females	
	1985	1985	% Chance	1980	1985	% Change	1980	1985
Whites	52,710	54,991	4.3	7,794	9,555	22.6	14.8	17.4
Blacks	6,317	6,921	9.6	2,889	3,299	14.2	45.7	47.7
Hispanics	3,235	4,206	30.0	817	1,231	50.7	25.3	29.3
Total	60,309	63,558	5.4	10,903	13,168	20.8	18.1	20.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report, Series P-60.

Appendix 1. Number of Underclass Behaviors Exhibited among Minorities in Individual Census Tracts, 1980

	Number of Behaviors Found in Tract			
	50 Percent Higher than city average	Twice City Average	50 Percent Higher that city average	Twice City Average
Five Points				
16	5	2	5	3
24.01	5	4	4	3
20.02	4	3	NA	NA
Auraria-Lincoln Park & Sun Valley				
8			5	4
18	Not applicable		4	4
9	Not applicable		5	3

Underclass Behaviors		Cut Offs	
		Plus 50% Level	Plus 100% Level
1.	Percent of persons 16+ out of labor force	49	66
2.	Percent of households with welfare income	11	14
3.	Percent of persons 25+ with fewer than 12 years of education	38	50
4.	Percent of persons 16-19 not enrolled in school and not high school graduates	32	42
5.	Percent of families headed by females	27	36

FIGURE 1



DENVER NEIGHBORHOOD PROFILE:

POVERTY RATE, ALL PERSONS, 1980

OVER 40% 30-40%

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